The 60-day ceasefire that has brought relative quiet to northern Israel and Lebanon was supposed to expire on Jan. 26. However, in the absence of a long-term settlement, the ceasefire has been extended until Feb. 18.
This has resulted in Israel extending its presence in Lebanon and with limited violence already flaring up, the quiet the ceasefire brought is still at risk of failing. But it is not too late to save the relative peace between Israel and Lebanon—provided the international community is willing to do what it takes.
A robust international peacekeeping force with an expansive mandate and permissive rules of engagement could help bring stability to this troubled border. Introducing such a force is not a novel suggestion as the UN has previously established other missions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and could do so again in Lebanon. This solution is not without its challenges, but it presents the best way forward.
RABIH DAHER/AFP via Getty Images
Admittedly, multinational peacekeeping forces do not have a good track record in Lebanon. Since 1978, every outbreak of violence between Israel and Lebanon has ended in much the same way—a temporary ceasefire supported by some form of UN peacekeeping force. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) first entered the country in 1978 to restore peace and security and assist the Lebanese government in southern Lebanon. Unfortunately, the first UNIFIL mission failed and had to be repeatedly renewed as part of agreements reached in 1982, 2000, and 2006, each time with a slight upgrade.
In the runup to Oct. 7, 2023, UNIFIL once again proved incapable of delivering on its mission to disarm Hezbollah and keep the border quiet. By the time Hezbollah launched its bombardment of Israel in solidarity with Hamas’ vicious attack on Israel, the militant Lebanese organization had managed to build a significant military capability under the nose of UNFIL and was more robust than ever before.
This pattern of UNIFIL ineffectiveness, together with the failure of other UN forces in the region to prevent war in the past, have destroyed Israel’s trust in the ability of the international community to deliver on peacekeeping pledges. In each of these cases, international involvement has failed to make a significant difference because they lacked robustness, a clear mission, and relied on the physical support of the Lebanese government. This will have to change if the international community wants to break the cycle of violence in Lebanon.
At the heart of each previous mission was a lightly armed and equipped UN force deployed to monitor the ceasefire and assist the Lebanese government in restoring its authority. These UN missions deployed with limited authority and rules of engagement that largely prevented them from using force other than as a last resort in self-defense. Furthermore, these peacekeepers could only act in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces. These two facets of UNIFIL provide much of the reason for its repeated failures.
To preserve the ceasefire and create of the conditions for peace, any future multinational force must have the ability to operate on its own to enforce its mandate. Lebanon began experiencing significant instability in 1958. This culminated with the outbreak of a brutal civil war in 1975, which lasted more than a decade.
The recent appointment of a new president and prime minister in Lebanon gives hope for stronger governance, but any new government is unlikely to risk challenging Hezbollah militarily as this could potentially plunge the country back into civil war. In 2008, when Hezbollah affiliated forces stormed several neighborhoods in Beirut and other areas of the country, the Lebanese Armed Forces did little in response. They even supported some of Hezbollah’s demands.
It is not just the Lebanese military that has shown little desire to confront Hezbollah; as a major political party, Hezbollah has been part of the Lebanese government for many years. Indeed, current delays in the deployment of the Lebanese Army south of the Litani River contributed to the IDF decision to maintain a presence in strategic positions in Southern Lebanon beyond the 60-day ceasefire.
The relative weakness of those within Lebanon who oppose Hezbollah is unlikely to change in the immediate future. Therefore, if a multinational force intends to fulfil its mandate and enforce the ceasefire terms by guaranteeing that Hezbollah withdraw north of the Litani River, it must be able to act even without a request from the Lebanese government.
Confronting Hezbollah inherently involves the use of force. As Hezbollah taught the world through its attacks on U.S. and French forces deployed to Lebanon in the 1980s, opposing Hezbollah can cost lives. Foreign governments understand that peacekeeping on this frontier can be risky business and several UNIFIL personnel were injured during the recent fighting between the IDF and Hezbollah.
The risk of casualties creates a particular challenge as countries commit forces to UNIFIL voluntarily and can withdraw them at any time, as Argentina did in November 2024. To reduce the vulnerability of international forces to Hezbollah attacks, UNIFIL must have more robust equipment. It will need capabilities such as heavy armor and air support that will allow it to conduct its mission while protecting itself.
For such a force to succeed, the international community must couple these capabilities with more permissive rules of engagement. Currently UNIFIL peacekeepers must avoid confrontations and only use force as a last resort in self-defense. Hezbollah can easily take advantage of these constraints. Only a force that possesses both capabilities and the ability to use them in pursuit of their mission can change this dynamic.
Elsewhere, the UN has established mechanisms for providing more robust rules of engagement to peacekeeping and peace-enforcement forces by establishing the missions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. That would go some way to addressing the challenges in Lebanon.
This more robust force, with ample capabilities and authorities, would address both the concerns of troop-contributing countries and the apprehensions of Israeli and Lebanese leaders. In weaking Hezbollah’s hold in Southern Lebanon, such a force would also help the Lebanese government to lessen the influence of Hezbollah and other malign actors in the country and strengthen the government’s autonomy.
The 60-day ceasefire that has brought relative quiet to northern Israel and Lebanon was supposed to expire on Jan. 26. However, in the absence of a long-term settlement, the ceasefire has been extended until Feb. 18.
This has resulted in Israel extending its presence in Lebanon and with limited violence already flaring up, the quiet the ceasefire brought is still at risk of failing. But it is not too late to save the relative peace between Israel and Lebanon—provided the international community is willing to do what it takes.
A robust international peacekeeping force with an expansive mandate and permissive rules of engagement could help bring stability to this troubled border. Introducing such a force is not a novel suggestion as the UN has previously established other missions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and could do so again in Lebanon. This solution is not without its challenges, but it presents the best way forward.
Admittedly, multinational peacekeeping forces do not have a good track record in Lebanon. Since 1978, every outbreak of violence between Israel and Lebanon has ended in much the same way—a temporary ceasefire supported by some form of UN peacekeeping force. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) first entered the country in 1978 to restore peace and security and assist the Lebanese government in southern Lebanon. Unfortunately, the first UNIFIL mission failed and had to be repeatedly renewed as part of agreements reached in 1982, 2000, and 2006, each time with a slight upgrade.
In the runup to Oct. 7, 2023, UNIFIL once again proved incapable of delivering on its mission to disarm Hezbollah and keep the border quiet. By the time Hezbollah launched its bombardment of Israel in solidarity with Hamas’ vicious attack on Israel, the militant Lebanese organization had managed to build a significant military capability under the nose of UNFIL and was more robust than ever before.
This pattern of UNIFIL ineffectiveness, together with the failure of other UN forces in the region to prevent war in the past, have destroyed Israel’s trust in the ability of the international community to deliver on peacekeeping pledges. In each of these cases, international involvement has failed to make a significant difference because they lacked robustness, a clear mission, and relied on the physical support of the Lebanese government. This will have to change if the international community wants to break the cycle of violence in Lebanon.
At the heart of each previous mission was a lightly armed and equipped UN force deployed to monitor the ceasefire and assist the Lebanese government in restoring its authority. These UN missions deployed with limited authority and rules of engagement that largely prevented them from using force other than as a last resort in self-defense. Furthermore, these peacekeepers could only act in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces. These two facets of UNIFIL provide much of the reason for its repeated failures.
To preserve the ceasefire and create of the conditions for peace, any future multinational force must have the ability to operate on its own to enforce its mandate. Lebanon began experiencing significant instability in 1958. This culminated with the outbreak of a brutal civil war in 1975, which lasted more than a decade.
The recent appointment of a new president and prime minister in Lebanon gives hope for stronger governance, but any new government is unlikely to risk challenging Hezbollah militarily as this could potentially plunge the country back into civil war. In 2008, when Hezbollah affiliated forces stormed several neighborhoods in Beirut and other areas of the country, the Lebanese Armed Forces did little in response. They even supported some of Hezbollah’s demands.
It is not just the Lebanese military that has shown little desire to confront Hezbollah; as a major political party, Hezbollah has been part of the Lebanese government for many years. Indeed, current delays in the deployment of the Lebanese Army south of the Litani River contributed to the IDF decision to maintain a presence in strategic positions in Southern Lebanon beyond the 60-day ceasefire.
The relative weakness of those within Lebanon who oppose Hezbollah is unlikely to change in the immediate future. Therefore, if a multinational force intends to fulfil its mandate and enforce the ceasefire terms by guaranteeing that Hezbollah withdraw north of the Litani River, it must be able to act even without a request from the Lebanese government.
Confronting Hezbollah inherently involves the use of force. As Hezbollah taught the world through its attacks on U.S. and French forces deployed to Lebanon in the 1980s, opposing Hezbollah can cost lives. Foreign governments understand that peacekeeping on this frontier can be risky business and several UNIFIL personnel were injured during the recent fighting between the IDF and Hezbollah.
The risk of casualties creates a particular challenge as countries commit forces to UNIFIL voluntarily and can withdraw them at any time, as Argentina did in November 2024. To reduce the vulnerability of international forces to Hezbollah attacks, UNIFIL must have more robust equipment. It will need capabilities such as heavy armor and air support that will allow it to conduct its mission while protecting itself.
For such a force to succeed, the international community must couple these capabilities with more permissive rules of engagement. Currently UNIFIL peacekeepers must avoid confrontations and only use force as a last resort in self-defense. Hezbollah can easily take advantage of these constraints. Only a force that possesses both capabilities and the ability to use them in pursuit of their mission can change this dynamic.
Elsewhere, the UN has established mechanisms for providing more robust rules of engagement to peacekeeping and peace-enforcement forces by establishing the missions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. That would go some way to addressing the challenges in Lebanon.
This more robust force, with ample capabilities and authorities, would address both the concerns of troop-contributing countries and the apprehensions of Israeli and Lebanese leaders. In weaking Hezbollah’s hold in Southern Lebanon, such a force would also help the Lebanese government to lessen the influence of Hezbollah and other malign actors in the country and strengthen the government’s autonomy.
Dr. Jacob Stoil is the Chair of Applied History at West Point Modern War Institute, Senior Fellow of 40th ID Urban Warfare Center, and Trustee of the US Commission on Military History. He can be found on X at @JacobStoil
Dr. Mary Elizabeth Walters is Director of Military Theory and Assistant Professor of Military and Security Studies at the Air Command and Staff College, and Trustee for the Society for Military History.
Dr. Nir Arielli is a Professor of International History at the University of Leeds. He specializes in the modern history of the Middle East. His most recent book, The Dead Sea: A 10,000 Year History, was recently published with Yale University Press.
The views expressed in this article represent the personal views of the authors and are not necessarily the views of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, the United State Air Force, Army University, Air University, or the U.S. Military Academy.
